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JOSHUA MEYROWITZ

TV Politics: Seeing More than We Want,
Knowing Less than We Need
How is it that the public and the press have come to have so little
faith in, and to feel so little in awe of, our national leaders and the
political process in general? Why do we citizens feel that we know too
much about politicians' personal lives ─ their families, their failings,
their affairs, even what type of underwear they prefer ─ while, at the
same time, we sense we are being told too little about significant social
issues?
This essay offers two different answers to these questions. Neither
answer, however, involves the typical approach of looking at the
backgrounds and experiences of individual politicians or at their
rhetorical and other strategies. In neither answer do I suggest that we
simply no longer have any great leaders.
Instead, I argue first that in an era of ``television politics,''
politicians have lost a great deal of control over the traditional
``staging'' of the role of ``great leader.'' And second, I suggest that the
centrality of television in today's politics has encouraged powerful elites
to try to exercise even greater control over what types of politicians
become visible to the public in the first place.
To develop the first answer, I focus on the ways in which
television is different from other modes of communication and on
how those differences interact with the role of ``great leader.'' In
developing my second answer, I offer a case study to suggest that
candidates who are not tied to powerful and wealthy elites have a
difficult time gaining national media attention.
_______________
Joshua Meyrowitz is Professor of Communication at the University of New
Hampshire. This essay is adapted from a Keynote Address given at the Third
Annual Media Studies Symposium at Sacred Heart University on November 3,
1996. A more detailed version of the Agran campaign case study appears in the
author's article, ``Visible and Invisible Candidates: A Case Study in
`Competing Logics' of Campaign Coverage,'' Political Communication, 11, No.
2 (1994), pp. 145-64.
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Our ``Crisis in Leadership''
There has been a great deal of concern in the United States over
the last thirty years with our ``crisis in leadership.'' President Lyndon
Johnson abdicated his office. Richard Nixon resigned the presidency
in disgrace. Gerald Ford's automatic succession to the presidency was
later rejected by the electorate. Jimmy Carter's re-election bid ended in
a landslide loss to Ronald Reagan. George Bush ended his one-term
presidency seemingly out of touch with the people and challenged
from within his own party. President Bill Clinton struggled through his
first term with the public's perception that he is indecisive and
untruthful. He went on to win reelection, but largely, it seemed,
because the public was even less enthusiastic about his major
opponent, Bob Dole.
Even Ronald Reagan, who served two full terms and is often
considered our most popular recent president, was never fully able to
escape the image of being an ``amiable dunce.'' Long before the
Iran-Contra scandal tarnished Reagan's image further, polls suggested
that while he was a ``likable person,'' many of the people who voted
for him disagreed with his policies and did not rate him highly in ability
or intelligence.
In short, we seem to be having difficulty finding leaders who have
charisma and style and who are also competent, intelligent, and
trustworthy. During the 1980 presidential election, Newsweek analyzed
recent political polls and concluded that: ``Perhaps the most telling
political finding of all is the high degree of disenchantment voters feel
about most of the major candidates.'' If anything, the situation was even
worse a dozen years later, when a New York Times/CBS poll
indicated that more than 40% of those surveyed wished that other
candidates had entered the race. In addition, the faith that there are
other potentially better candidates is also eroding. The New York
Times wrote in 1992 that while George Bush had no ``blueprints for
the future'' of the United States, he also had little competition among
the major presidential contenders or in Congress. Similarly, during the
1996 campaign, Time magazine referred to President Clinton as ``the
least worst candidate'' and the New York Times described him as
``winning the Battle of the Lesser Evils.''
Every horse race has its winner, of course, and no matter how
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uninspiring a field of candidates emerges, people will always have their
favorites. In this sense, the typical analyses of which candidate won an
election and why, as well as the news media's obsession with minor
shifts in poll percentage points, only obscure the more fundamental
issue of the overall decline in the image of leaders in general.

Television Demystifies
I suggest that the widespread use of television has a great deal to
do with the decline in the prestige of leaders. Television has
encouraged the perception that we know our leaders ``personally.''
This change diminishes the apparent mediating roles of political
parties and journalists. Although this change sounds positive in the
abstract, and may in fact be part of a beneficial and democratizing
long-term trend, its most visible consequence at this time is an
increasingly negative view of politicians on the part of the public and
the press.
To be perceived as a ``great leader,'' one cannot simply be great,
one must behave like a great person. Leadership, is not simply

something an individual ``has.'' It is something that exists in specific
interactions and rituals in specific social situations. Television has
reduced the number of settings of greatness in our country.
Since every individual is, in some ways at least, ``ordinary,'' the
performance of the role of ``greatness'' depends on distance and
mystery. The need for a carefully staged and controlled performance is
made clear in many ``training manuals'' for high-status positions.
Balthasar Gracian, the seventeenth-century rector of the Jesuit College,
for example, advised priests to ``Mix a little mystery with everything''
because mystery ``arouses veneration.'' Machiavelli offered similar
advice and suggested that princes should carefully stage-manage their
public appearances and emphasize certain personal traits while
concealing others.
Before the widespread use of electronic media, the towns and
cities of the country served as backstage areas of rehearsal and
mystification for national political figures. The legendary oratory of
politicians such as three-time presidential candidate William Jennings
Bryan and the treasured images of many of our other political heroes
were made possible by their ability to practice and modify their public
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performances. Early mistakes could be limited to small forums, minor
changes could be tested, and speeches and presentations could be
honed to perfection. By the time Bryan delivered his powerful ``cross
of gold'' speech to win the nomination for President at the 1896
Democratic convention, for example, he had practiced the speech
many times in different parts of the country.
A few well-turned phrases could once be used by politicians to
thrill many different audiences on many different days. Bryan, for
example, was very fond of his closing line in the 1896 speech (``You
shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you
shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold'') ─ so fond, in fact, that
he had used it many times in other speeches and debates. In his
memoirs, Bryan noted his early realization of the line's ``fitness for
the conclusion of a climax,'' and after using it in smaller arenas, he
``laid it away for a proper occasion.''
Bryan's strategy now sounds charmingly old-fashioned. Today,
through radio and television, wherever a national politician speaks, he
or she addresses people all over the country. Major speeches,
therefore, cannot be tested in advance. Because major speeches can be
presented only once, they tend to be relatively coarse and undramatic.
And inspiring lines ─ grist for the sound-bite mill ─ are either
expended quickly or become relatively weak clichés.
National politicians could once tailor their talks to those physically
present and buttress their central platforms with slightly different
promises to different audiences. Today, because politicians address so
many different types of people simultaneously via radio and television,
they have greater difficulty speaking in specifics. If they make different
promises when speaking in the midwest than when speaking in New
York City, they appear cynical and manipulative to the mediated
audiences. Yet if they make the same speeches everywhere, they seem
bland and unimaginative, as well as ignorant of local issues and
concerns.
With audiences in the millions, any slip of the tongue or
ill-conceived phrase (such as Ross Perot's referring to a black audience
as ``you people'' during the 1992 campaign, or Bill Clinton's infamous
``but I didn't inhale'') or even an ill-advised gesture (such as George
Bush glancing at his watch during a debate) is amplified in significance
because millions of people have witnessed it. So wise politicians tend
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to be very cautious ─ and thus rather boring ─ as they try to stick to a
script devised with the help of their media advisors.
Many Americans are still hoping for the emergence of an old-style,
dynamic ``great leader.'' Yet electronic media, particularly the highly
exposing medium of television, are making it almost impossible for
such leadership to manifest itself. There is no lack of potential leaders,
but there is an overabundance of personal information about them.
The speaker's platform once lifted politicians up and away from
average citizens, both literally and symbolically. In newspaper quotes
and reports, the politician ─ as flesh and bones person ─ was
completely absent. And on radio, politicians were disembodied voices.
But the television camera now lowers politicians to the level of the
common citizen and brings them close for our inspection. In recent
years, we have seen our presidents sweat, stammer, and stumble ─ all
in living color.
To be carried off smoothly, today's political performances
requires what I have called a new ``middle region'' style: behavior that
lacks the extreme formality of what sociologist Erving Goffman would
call traditional ``front region'' or onstage behavior, but also lacks the
extreme informality of what Goffman refers to as ``back region'' or
backstage behavior.
Wise politicians try to make the most of the new political stage by
matching their visible behaviors to the new, informal stage. They
attempt to expose selected, positive aspects of their backstage lives in
order to ingratiate themselves with the public: they appear on talk
shows as ``ordinary people''; they push their families and feelings into
the public arena; they field questions from children and average
citizens; they admit some of their doubts and mistakes and marital
problems; if they can, they play an instrument or sing with the band.
They ``share'' with us.
Some politicians clearly succeed in the new public arena better
than others. Yet there is a big difference between coping with the new
situation and truly controlling it. Regardless of how well individual
politicians adjust to the new exposure, the overall image of leaders has
changed in the process. The new political performance remains a
performance, but its style is markedly changed. And for both better
and worse, the aura surrounding our leaders is diminished.
Presidential images were once much better protected. Before
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television coverage of press conferences, newspapers were not even
allowed to quote a president without his explicit permission. As late as
the start of the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s, the New York
Times and other publications had to paraphrase the President's
answers to questions. In earlier administrations, journalists had to
submit their questions in advance and were forbidden to mention
which questions the President refused to answer. Presidential advisors
frequently corrected presidents' answers during meetings with the
press, and such assistance went unreported.
In the face of a ``crisis,'' our presidents once had many hours,
sometimes even weeks or months, to consult with advisors and to
formulate policy statements to be printed in newspapers. But now,
standing before the nation, a president is often expected to have all
relevant information in his head ─ without notes and without
consultation with advisors. A president must often start a sentence
before the end of the sentence is fully formed in his mind. Even a
five-second pause for thought can seriously damage a leader's
credibility. I believe that the apparent inarticulateness of all our recent
presidents may be related more to the immediacy of television than to
a decline in our leaders' mental or leadership abilities.
Television also differs from print in its basic form of information.
In words, the titles ``President,'' ``Governor,'' ``Senator'' still call
forth respect. But the close-up TV pictures of the persons filling those
offices are rarely as impressive. We cannot help but notice the sweat
on the brow, the nervous twitch, the bags under the eyes, or the excess
makeup.
Television not only reduces our awe of politicians, it increases
politicians' self-doubt and lowers self-esteem. A speaker's nervousness
and mistakes usually are politely ignored by live audiences and
therefore soon forgotten by the speaker as well. But with videotape,
politicians have permanent records of themselves misspeaking or
anxiously licking their lips.
For all these reasons, television may be a prime cause of the
complaints of indecisive leadership that we have heard since the
mid-1960s.
In the 1950s, many people were upset that a genuine hero, Dwight
Eisenhower, felt the need to hire a Hollywood actor to help him with
his television appearances. But we have become much more
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sophisticated ─ and more cynical. We now know that one cannot
simply be the President, but that one has to perform the role of
``President.'' By 1980, it did not seem strange that a skilled actor had
become President, with advisors to help him with the substantive
aspects of his role.
Ironically, the new communication arena not only demands more
control on the part of politicians, it also makes the attempts at control
more visible. Again, the net effect is demystifying. Many citizens lived
through twelve years of Franklin Roosevelt's presidency without being
aware that his legs were crippled and that he often needed help to
stand. But we are now constantly exposed to the ways in which our
presidents and presidential candidates attempt to manipulate their
images to create certain impressions and effects.
The result is that we no longer experience political performances
as naive audiences. We have the perspective of stage hands who are
aware of the constructed nature of the drama. Television provides
what I call ``sidestage'' views of public figures. We watch politicians
move from backstage to onstage to backstage. We see politicians
address crowds of well-wishers, then greet their families ``in private.''
We join candidates as they speak with their advisors, and we sit behind
them as they watch conventions on television. We see candidates
address many different types of audiences in many different settings.
Certainly, we prefer a good show to a bad show, but we are not fully
taken in even by a great performance, because we are so aware of it
being merely a ``performance.'' Instead, we are at best willingly
entertained, charmed, courted, and seduced. Ironically, all the recent
discussions of how we are being manipulated by politicians and their
image makers may merely signify how visible and exposed the
machinations now are.
The trend in media development over the last century has been
toward increasing intimacy and revelation. From the portrait to the
photograph to the movie to radio to the video close-up, media have
been providing a closer, more replicative, more immediate image of
our leaders. This trend has led to a blurring of the criteria used to
evaluate private and public behaviors.
Private interactions have always been dominated by concrete
appearance, gestures, and vocalization. The key questions in the
personal realm is: ``What is the person like?'' But the public sphere

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1997

7

Sacred Heart University Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 2

22

JOSHUA MEYROWITZ

was once tied closely to the abstractions of language. The key question
of the public realm once was: ``What has the person said, written, and
accomplished?''
We do not normally reject a potential lover or friend based on a
poor résumé, and before television, voters had little opportunity to
react negatively to national candidates because they were unpleasant to
watch from a few feet away. But television has increasingly fostered the
use of ``dating criteria'' over ``résumé criteria'' in the public sphere.
Television closeups simulate an interpersonal distance of about
two feet. Even in real life, that is a distance of seduction or threat, not
of rational discussion. When we are on a first date, for example, our
impression of its success or failure relies relatively little on what our
companion says. The words, ``What a nice meal'' or ``Thank you for
a very pleasant time'' don't tell us much. So we search for other cues:
How often does she look at me? How close to me is he standing?
Does she seem nervous? Does he look bored? Similarly, television's
sensuality makes language seem secondary.
Language certainly continues to play a role in television, but it is
often overshadowed by the nonverbal. It is difficult to imagine
someone reading a newspaper transcript of a speech by a politician he
or she has never seen, and saying: ``Well, I disagree with that
argument, that statement is false, and this sentence makes no sense at
all. . . . But you know something, I really like the guy!'' Such a response
would seem crazy. Yet this is the manner in which many viewers
respond to politicians on television news. Therefore, even though we
are clearly not oblivious to the words spoken on TV, we tend to react
to them in an intimate context. Vice President Al Gore, for example, is
an articulate speaker, but more attention has been paid to how ``stiff''
he appears on television than to anything he has ever said. Indeed, so
much attention has been paid to Gore's stiffness, that he himself often
feels obligated to joke about it in his speeches and talk show
appearances.
Polls indicate that many citizens are now willing to vote for a
national candidate with whom they disagree on the issues because they
``personally like'' the candidate. (About a third of Ronald Reagan's
votes in the 1980 election, for example, came from such
``supporters.'') The reverse is also true: citizens hesitate to vote for a
candidate whose positions are similar to their own if they do not
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``like'' the candidate ``as a person.'' Such reactions grow out of the
sense, fostered by television, that we have met and ``know'' our
leaders personally.
So we seem to be evaluating potential presidents today by drawing
partly on the type of criteria people use in choosing a sports teammate:
it doesn't have to be someone who necessarily agrees with us on ``the
issues of the day'' or someone we look up to as brilliant or heroic or as
a moral giant, as long as we can tolerate spending time with them on a
regular basis. Or put differently, presidential campaigns are now
courtships to win a four-year close relationship with the public.
The new political context of television is both personalizing and
demystifying. The results can be confusing ─ and uncomfortable ─ for
both politician and viewer. When Richard Nixon died, for example,
ABC chose to air, among other clips, Nixon's painfully awkward
attempts to respond to a question by Barbara Walters that he was a
cold and unemotional man.
On the one hand, there is something reassuring about these new,
humanized images of our leaders. There is a measure of safety in them
as well: as politicians appear more like ordinary people, we may be less
likely to follow them blindly into an unnecessary war or other folly. But
something is also lost. Although style and image play an important part
in social relationships, they are severely limited as forms of public
discourse. Extensive use of words is necessary if one wants to present
linear arguments, suggest complex if-then relationships, and state
propositions that can be proven true or false. One cannot explain
social policy with a smile and wink. Observations of our leaders' good
and bad hair days may be amusing, but they do little to improve the
future of our republic.
Television also undermines traditional forms of political authority
by giving us the sense that we directly witness events. Most of our
information about other countries, for example, once came through
the President and State Department, often after careful planning about
how to present the information to the public. This allowed the
government to appear to be in control of events and always to have a
ready response. ``Official sources'' still shape many of the verbal
narratives in news, but in many instances today, we experience events
at the same moment as our leaders. The dramatic images of People
Power in the Philippines, Chinese students protesting in Tiananmen
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Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the war in Bosnia, massacres in
Africa, and so on have been watched by the President, the Secretary of
State, and millions of other Americans at the same moment. The same
is true for many events within our own country. The immediacy of
television often makes leaders appear to be ``standing on the
sidelines'' rather than taking charge or reacting quickly.
As our leaders have lost much control over the flow of
information ─ both about themselves and political events ─ they have
mostly given up trying to behave like the imperial leaders of the past.
We now have politicians who strive to act more like the person next
door, just as our real neighbors seem more worldly and demand to
have a greater say in national and international affairs.
What is clear is that the current drive toward intimacy with our
leaders involves a fundamental paradox. In pursuing our desire to be
``close'' to great people or to confirm their greatness through closer
scrutiny, we often destroy their ability to function as great people.
Much human activity is common to all individuals. If high-status
persons cannot segregate such behavior from their onstage high-status
performances, then they appear to be more like everyone else. By
providing greater access to, and awareness of, backstage behavior,
television tends to undermine traditional abstractions of status.
``Greatness'' manifests itself in the onstage performance and, by
definition, in its isolation from backstage behaviors. Yet when we say
that we want to see what authorities are ``really like,'' we generally
mean we want to see what they are least like, that is, both how they
behave least often in the role they hope to perform for us, and also the
least they can be in social terms. In intimate spheres, people are often
much alike: they eat, they eliminate, they get tired, they sleep, they
make love, they lose their tempers, they groom, they indulge in whims
and self-involvements.
There is, therefore, an inherent ``vanishing truth'' paradox in the
use of television to give us a close-up view of our politicians and other
authorities. When we see our leaders in varieties of situations and
locations, when we observe them as they respond to spontaneous
interviews or as they grow weary from a day of work or campaigning,
we do not simply learn more about them. By searching behind the
fronts of performers, we also diminish the roles that can be performed
and perceived. Few of our past ``great leaders'' would fare very well if
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they lived in our current media environment.
On television, our politicians feel driven to be intimate with us, but
then they wake up to discover that we don't respect them in the
morning. We have seen too much of them to remain enchanted by
them. One reason the public is no longer in awe of politicians,
therefore, is that television has made it difficult for political leaders to
perform traditional roles of ``greatness.''

Limited Knowledge
But there is another fundamental reason for disenchantment, and
this one is much less visible. Rather than focusing on our seeing too
much, the second reason highlights how little we still know. We are
told too little about significant issues, and we are barred from learning
about candidates and potential candidates who might be willing to talk
about those issues.
The personal, intimate views of politicians on TV alter the
structure and logic of the political process. The party's function as a
mediator between candidate and voter, for example, is dramatically
undermined by media that give us an increasing sense that we have
``met'' and ``know'' our leaders personally. Newspaper endorsements
have also lost much of their influence. Why should we leave it to
others to tell us what to think about candidates when we can judge
them for ourselves? But the major parties and the press are still very
powerful in telling the public who the ``major'' candidates are in the
first place. We are asked by both the parties and our news media to
forget about the possibility of other candidates.
Ross Perot brought this issue to the public's attention during the
1996 campaign, which led Larry King to include him and then other
candidates in his CNN television program after the debates.
Ambassador Alan Keyes's exclusion from a debate (after his inclusion
in earlier forums) also brought some attention to this issue.
But the public remains generally unaware of how serious the
situation is, and how even experienced candidates of the two major
parties are systematically excluded from news coverage and ballot
access. To make this point, I'll focus in the rest of this essay on a case
study about a particular presidential candidate during the 1992
campaign who had difficulty getting any national press attention. The
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real question that emerges from this case study, however, is not who is
running in a particular year and not getting coverage, but how many
other candidates have not even bothered to run at all because of the
predictable pattern of media exclusion.
On August 22, 1991 Larry Agran launched his campaign for the
presidency from his home town of Irvine, in Orange County,
California. Agran's announcement speech offered a detailed plan for a
``New American Security'' that put ``human need at home ahead of
military overkill abroad.'' That same day, the Orange County edition of
the Los Angeles Times carried a 1200-word story on the
announcement on the first page of Section B, with part of the headline
reading: ``He May Not Win, but He Vows to Make Voice of
Liberalism Heard.'' Several follow-up articles appeared in the Orange
County edition the next day, including one titled ``Why Agran Could
Be a Primary Figure.'' But the main edition of the Los Angeles Times,
which is distributed nationally, was less encouraging. It carried only
one brief, 300-word story on the announcement, referring to
Democrat Agran's quest as ``the longest-shot candidacy of all'' within a
party that had only a long shot chance of winning the White House in
the first place. The story ran on page 46, the obituary page.
Thus, the general pattern that would repeat itself throughout the
campaign was established early: respectful coverage in the local media
(which have relatively little national political impact), contrasted with
marginalized national coverage that suggested that the Agran campaign
was ``dead on arrival.''
In September 1991, Larry Agran was one of only two declared
U.S. presidential candidates at the Sioux City Democratic Party Unity
Dinner. This was to be the first Democratic party event of the
presidential campaign season, and Agran, the other declared candidate
(former Senator Paul Tsongas), and several potential candidates spoke
there to an audience of 500 Democrats. A fleeting image that appeared
on Cable News Network showed Agran being greeted by Paul
Tsongas, Senator Tom Harkin, and Governor Bill Clinton. But when
the same encounter appeared in an Associated Press photo published
by the lasting ``newspaper of record,'' the New York Times, Agran
was nowhere to be seen. Paul Tsongas and Tom Harkin are seen
speaking and gesturing to some unseen person beyond the right
margin of the photograph. This is a good visual metaphor for Agran's
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campaign experience and the experience of most other so-called
``minor'' candidates.
Over the early weeks and months of the presidential campaign, as
other well-known politicians declared their candidacies, the national
press spent a considerable amount of time on them. The national
media also speculated at length about the hypothetical entries of two
prominent non-candidates ─ the Rev. Jesse Jackson and New York
Governor Mario Cuomo. But the real and ongoing Agran campaign
received little or no attention. In the rare instances when his name did
appear, he was described as a ``dark horse,'' a ``fringe candidate,''
``the longest of longshots,'' or ``an obscure contender'' (without any
acknowledgment by journalists that the paucity of their own coverage
of Agran might be contributing to his ``obscurity'').
Agran was barred from most of the televised debates on the basis
of criteria that shifted as he tried to meet them. When he was allowed
to participate in forums with the so-called ``major'' candidates, he was
often left out of news reports of the events or was asked by press
photographers to move aside. If he was scheduled to speak last, the
press usually left before his speech, and was not there to hear or report
on what he said or on the audience reaction. Agran would hold press
conferences, and few if any journalists would attend, and fewer still
news reports would appear. With Catch-22 logic, Agran was told by
news media executives that he had not earned the right to media
exposure, because, among other things, he had not received enough
media exposure.
To be fair to those making such news judgments, thirty-six
candidates entered the Democratic race in New Hampshire. Further,
much of Agran's dark-horse status derived from his unconventional
credentials as a presidential contender. Although he is a Harvard Law
School graduate and published author who has devoted twenty years to
public service, he has never held statewide or national office. He
served for twelve years as an elected official in Irvine, California,
America's largest master-planned city. Most national journalists I spoke
with dismissed him based on his having held only local office. Of
course, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that bars a local
official from running for the presidency. Further, the national media's
conceptions of what makes for a viable candidate are arbitrary and
changeable. For example, until recently the major media would have
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dismissed anyone who was ``only'' a Congressmen (who represents a
local district rather than a state) or was ``only'' a former Senator or
Governor. In 1992, Agran's status as a former mayor did not meet the
unstated criteria held by most national journalists. As journalist Roger
Mudd put it at the start of a rare TV interview with Agran: ``It does
stretch credulity to think that a Jewish ex-mayor of a small suburban
California town can make it.''
Agran's supporters, of course, took a different view. They pointed
out that, as Irvine's first directly elected mayor, Agran received national
acclaim (including significant media attention) for the numerous
progressive programs he had initiated, including elderly housing,
childcare, mass transportation, one of the nation's first curbside
recycling programs, preservation of undeveloped land, and hazardous
waste regulations. They noted that, as Executive Director of the Center
for Innovative Diplomacy (a foreign policy think tank), Agran played a
unique role as a ``global mayor,'' who pursued issues of international
trade, arms reduction, and human rights, and earned his city a United
Nations award for his pioneering legislation to eliminate
ozone-depleting compounds ─ all from an unlikely base in deeply
conservative Orange Country. (Orange County had given Reagan and
Bush one of their largest voting margins in the country.) Agran's
supporters described him as the most articulate presidential contender
with the boldest and most specific blueprint for shifting cold war
military spending to post-cold war domestic needs. Agran, they argued,
had much more governing experience than Pat Buchanan and Ross
Perot put together, and more foreign policy experience than Bill
Clinton had at that time. They also claimed that the public's reaction to
many of Agran's appearances was so positive that his ideas deserved to
be heard ─ and allowed to influence the platforms of the ``major''
candidates ─ even if Agran himself had little chance of winning the
nomination. And they argued that, regardless of anything else, since
Agran's campaign had achieved access to about forty primary and
caucus ballots, the public deserved to be told something about him so
as to be able to make an informed choice in the voting booth.
(Ironically, Agran would have been on many more that 40 ballots had
not the other states required ``significant press attention'' as one of the
criteria of ballot inclusion.)
Of course, it is no surprise that Agran's supporters saw more in
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him than did most national journalists. What is surprising, however, is
the extent to which Agran's campaign received encouragement from
the coverage of the local New Hampshire press reporting on the
first-in-the nation primary, as well as from at least two nationally-known
columnists, Colman McCarthy and Sydney Schanberg. In New
Hampshire, there were dozens of newspaper articles, editorials,
columns, and letters to the editor, which described Agran's exclusion
and/or supported his right to be heard in national debates. Sample
headlines ran: ``Larry Agran Deserves a Place in Democratic Primary
Debates''; ``He's Out with the in-Crowd''; ``Unlock the Process''; and
``At Least Give Agran a Chance to Lose.'' Beyond New Hampshire,
McCarthy and Schanberg both wrote columns challenging Agran's
designation as a ``minor candidate'' and endorsing his right to be
heard and seen through debates and national news coverage.
Yet most of the rest of the mainstream national press rejected
Agran before a single vote was cast or any voter poll was taken. The
national press placed him in the same category with candidates who
merely paid $1,000 to be put on one ballot, in New Hampshire, and
had little else in the way of background, experience, or campaign.
Those candidates with whom Agran was functionally grouped included
a recovering alcoholic and drug addict and the bicycle-riding candidate
who proposed having sheep and goats tend to the front lawn of the
White House.
My purpose here is not to emphasize Larry Agran or to endorse
him for President, but rather to analyze the coverage and non-coverage
of the Agran campaign for what it tells us about U.S. presidential
campaign coverage in general. Agran's unusual status ─ as ``less than a
`major' candidate'' but ``more than a `fringe' candidate'' ─ helps to
make some of the implicit journalistic decisions about campaign
coverage more visible. Agran's anomalous status as a candidate makes
his campaign experiences a good lens through which to see aspects of
political campaign coverage that normally remain invisible.
To his dismay, Agran found that for him one of the rules of the
campaign was: ``To get press coverage, you must be disruptive.''
When he was barred by the Chairman of the State Democratic Party
from a televised Health Care Forum with presidential candidates in
Nashua, New Hampshire, for example, the normally soft-spoken
Agran stood up in the audience and demanded by what criteria he was
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being excluded. Responding to a signal from a state party official,
security police began to remove Agran from the hall, but the crowd's
shouts of ``Freedom of speech!'' and ``Let us vote!'' embarrassed the
men at the dais into inviting him to join them. (Another largely
uncovered candidate, the New Alliance Party's Lenora Fulani, who was
running in the New Hampshire primary as a Democrat, also took this
opportunity to join the other candidates.) Agran's confrontation with
party officials and his subsequent inclusion in the health forum was his
first widely reported ``campaign event'' ─ but little mention was made
of his innovative proposals for health care reform.
To prevent this sort of public call for inclusion from occurring
again (the State party chair called it ``intimidation''), the next state
Democratic party debate was moved to a high-security TV studio ─
with no audience permitted. Agran stood outside, among a crowd of
four hundred people, who braved zero-degree temperatures to protest
the exclusion of their candidates from the debates. (Most of the
protesters were supporters of Lenora Fulani, but several other
``fringe'' candidates were also represented.) As reported in the local
New Hampshire press, the protest offered many dramatic moments,
with the ``major'' candidates forced to pass ``picket lines for
democracy'' as protestors shouted ``Scab! Scab! Scab!'' Yet perhaps
because there was no violence and the event inside the studio was not
interrupted, the protest received almost no attention in the national
media.
Agran and his staff believed that at some point local press
attention would build into national exposure. But several reporters and
editors at national newspapers and magazines that I spoke with
admitted that the longer one has not covered a candidate, the harder it
becomes to do so. ``The obvious question in such situations,'' said
Alvin Sanoff, a senior editor at U.S. News & World Report, ``is
`Where have you been that you just discovered this person?' '' He also
noted that ``it's always safer to stay with the pack and be wrong, than
to risk going out on a limb and covering someone who then turns out
to not be that important.''
When local press coverage and protests had no impact on his
national media profile, Agran's campaign staff became convinced that
his status as a ``fringe'' candidate could be erased if he tied or passed
one or more of the ``major'' candidates in the polls. They were wrong.
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When Agran made his first measurable showing in a University of
New Hampshire/WMUR-TV poll taken from January 6 to 11, the
Associated Press story on the poll grouped Agran's results into a total
score for ``minor candidates and write-ins,'' without mentioning his
name. (In my local paper, the headline conveyed the story's focus:
``Clinton Still Making Great Strides in Primary Polls.'') When a
January 22 poll, conducted by the American Research Group (ARG),
showed Agran tied with former California Governor Jerry Brown and
Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, the polling group's press release suggested
three headlines, including ``Agran Appears in Democratic Race.'' But
the AP buried Agran's result in a single sentence two-thirds of the way
through a story focusing on Clinton as the front-runner. (In New
Hampshire's Union Leader the headline read: ``Polls Show Clinton
Ahead of President and the Democrats.'') When a follow-up ARG poll
showed Agran doubling his support and moving ahead of Brown, the
AP again focused on Clinton, but this time on the drop in his rating.
(In the New York Times, the headline read: ``Clinton Rating Falls in
Poll.''). Agran's tally was reported much further down in the story (after
Brown's lower score), and it was incorrectly referred to as Agran's
``first measurable showing in the poll.'' When the next ARG poll
showed Agran still between Brown and Harkin, ABC's World News
Sunday ─ perhaps to avoid the complexity of explaining the identity of
a candidate they had not been covering ─ simply dropped Agran's tally
from the middle of the reported poll results! Harkin's score was
followed directly by Brown's. This was crude and outrageous, of
course, and other major news organizations found a subtler way to
avoid the ``problem'' of skipping over a higher score to report a lower
one: they reported only on the top three names.
During the campaign Bill Clinton and his staff complained bitterly
about the aggressive press coverage Clinton received. But when seen in
a larger perspective, a different story emerges: the intensity of the focus
on Clinton, whether positive or negative in tone, generally worked to
his benefit ─ by keeping the spotlight on him, by allowing him to claim
that he had weathered brutal press coverage to become the
``comeback kid,'' and, most important, by obscuring the existence of
credible alternatives.
Agran, however, refused to disappear. His unusual appearance
with four of the so-called ``major candidates'' at the U.S. Conference
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of Mayors in January led to the first significant mention of his
campaign in the New York Times, which in effect declared him the
winner of the debate. The Times reported: ``After hearing pitches
from the Democratic Presidential contenders on how they would
revive America's cities, dozens of mayors meeting here today seemed
to agree on one thing: the single candidate who truly understands
urban needs is Larry Agran.'' Agran was mentioned in passing in
several other newspaper reports on the conference. Yet the Associated
Press, ABC radio news, and the All News Channel, along with the
other television reports I saw on the forum, did not even mention that
Agran was there.
Similarly, when Agran participated with the ``major'' candidates in
the Global Warming Leadership Forum in February, conference
organizer Carole Florman told me that the audience was ``very
enthusiastic about Larry Agran and less than enthusiastic about Bill
Clinton and Bob Kerrey.'' Yet all the major national news organizations
covering the event ─ ABC News, CBS News (through a local affiliate),
and the AP ─ omitted all mention of Agran from their reports.
Agran's tying or passing well-known candidates in several polls and
outperforming them at two forums ─ all within a ten-day period ─
could have been seen as a ``major story'' by the national news media.
But that story was never constructed and told.
As the pattern of exclusion from national coverage built, there
seemed to be nothing that Agran could do to register with the national
media. Press language even excluded evidence of his and other
``minor'' candidates' existence. A TV news program would report:
``Four out of the five Democratic presidential candidates were in
Manchester, New Hampshire today,'' as if there were no other
candidates. Or, a report would say: ``Bill Clinton spoke in Nashua,
New Hampshire today. The rest of the candidates were in other states''
─ while Agran was very much in New Hampshire and actively
campaigning.
We see this same pattern in the reporting of the February 23
South Dakota debate, which had long been scheduled to include
Agran. Agran gained an additional boost on the eve of the debate with
an endorsement for the presidency by the local Lakota Times (a
Native American paper). Yet when reporting on the eve of the unusual
debate with a sixth candidate, Larry Agran, NBC Nightly News
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reported ``All five Democrats are in South Dakota for a debate''
(emphasis added).
Agran's strong performance in the South Dakota debate
(especially his effective attacks on Jerry Brown for being only a very
recent convert with respect to campaign finance reform) led to the
most simultaneous national attention he had received at any point
during his campaign. Agran's participation was featured late that night
on some TV news programs (the debates took place after the evening
news programs had aired), including CNN Headline News. The next
day's Los Angeles Times called him ``the showstopper of the
evening,'' and the Boston Globe wrote ``One of the surprises of the
debate was the solid performance turned in by Larry Agran.'' The
same Globe reporter filed an article exclusively on Agran's
performance at the debate titled ``Larry Agran: `Winner' in Debate
with Little Chance for the Big Prize.'' The Washington Post and the
New York Times also reported on his participation. But by the day
after the debate, his presence at the forum began to fade from national
television. Of the nine reports on the debate on the network morning
news shows, only three mentioned his participation. By that evening,
he was gone. NBC Nightly News, which had mentioned only five
participants the night before, did not correct the number of
participants and showed video only of Clinton speaking briefly,
following by a clip of Harkin and Tsongas clashing at the debate.
ABC's World News Tonight featured the same clash between Harkin
and Tsongas. The CBS Evening News mentioned the South Dakota
primary, but had no report on the debate.
By the end of March 1992, Douglass Wilder, Tom Harkin, Bob
Kerrey, and Paul Tsongas had all suspended their campaigns. But the
narrowed Democratic field did not generate any increased attention to
Agran. After being ignored by the press for so long, there seemed to
be nothing Agran could do to register with the national media. Even
when Agran garnered more voter signatures to be placed on the New
York ballot than Jerry Brown, only Brown was allowed to participate in
New York City debates with Bill Clinton.
At the start of one debate at Lehman College in the Bronx on the
topic of urban problems ─ Agran's specialty ─ the hapless candidate
stood up and said ``I respectfully ask to be included in this forum.''
Agran was quickly tackled to the floor by plain clothes police, dragged
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down a flight of stairs head first, handcuffed, thrown into a police
paddy wagon until the debate was over, and then kept in custody at a
Bronx jail for four hours. He was booked on charges of disorderly
conduct, trespassing, and resisting arrest. Agran's New York City
campaign manager, who had been sitting next to Agran, was also
arrested. The TV cameras did not even turn away from the debate
stage to focus on any of this drama.
Agran's arrest received some coverage in New York, including a
brief mention in the New York Times (in the context of how the
extensive security at the debate had somehow not prevented this
disturbance). And Agran's home-state paper, the Los Angeles Times,
condemned the arrest in an editorial, saying that ``something's weird
when the former mayor of perhaps the most orderly city in the country
is busted for disorderly conduct in the most disorderly city in
America.'' But beyond that, there was largely silence. (The New York
Post could claim to have ``covered it,''in both senses of the word,
reporting: ``Two men were arrested inside the Lehman College
auditorium when they started heckling the candidates, according to
police.'')
One criterion for coverage that journalists cited when I spoke to
them early in the campaign was federal matching funds. Agran, they
told me, would be unable to qualify. But when Agran, without any
significant press coverage, did eventually qualify for federal matching
funds in mid-May ─ only the tenth candidate from all parties to do so
─ there was virtually no press mention of this, and no change in the
attention level he received. (The Washington Post, for example,
dutifully reported on the ``official'' news of the gaining of federal
funds, but the paper described him as a ``winless candidate'' who had
to be in New York during the Democratic Convention for another
reason: to face charges from a recent arrest.)
Agran did not win his party's nomination. But he did receive a few
delegate votes at the convention. They were listed on the TV screens
as votes for ``Other.''
Agran's trial for requesting inclusion in the Bronx, New York
debate was delayed several times, and he remained under threat of
imprisonment for ten months. All charges were finally dismissed on
January 19, 1993. (But after New York City successfully appealed the
expiration of their time to appeal, Agran was dragged into court again
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in 1996. Once more, a judge ruled in his favor. Agran countersued,
but he was barred by the judge in that trial from including any of the
details of his campaign experience, described here, and a jury found
ruled against him.) In spite of Agran's efforts to draw press attention to
his legal woes and their implications for an open political system,
neither the prolonged court proceedings nor the dismissals received
any significant news coverage.
By some measures at least, Agran's seventeen months of struggling
to be heard were filled with many ``newsworthy events.'' Yet the
national news media mostly ignored him. A computer search through
the Nexis system, for example, reveals that Agran's name did not
appear even once in the campaign stories of the major news
magazines, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report.
Between August 1, 1991 and December 7, 1992, Agran was
mentioned in 567 stories listed by Nexis (many of these were
redundant references in similar stories in different editions of the same
newspaper or different versions of the same wire release, or
non-campaign stories from the Orange County edition of the Los
Angeles Times). In contrast, during the same period, the number of
citations for some of the other candidates were: 4,527 for Wilder,
7,025 for Kerrey, 7,615 for Harkin, 9,266 for Buchanan, 11,476 for
Tsongas, and 14,288 for Brown. The search for Clinton citations was
halted at 82,229.
During and after the campaign, I spoke with a number of national
journalists at the Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, the Boston
Globe, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, NBC News,
Nightline, and other places. They all expressed little surprise over the
press treatment that Agran received, and they offered similar
explanations for it. Tom Rosenstiel, for example, who at the time
wrote on media and politics for the Los Angeles Times, suggested that
there are several reasons. For one thing, political reporters tend to
cover those candidates who their sources, the party professionals, tell
them are the ``major candidates.'' Reporters ask them: What are you
hearing?, Who is lining up endorsements? Who is doing fundraisers
for whom? ``This year, especially,'' said Rosenstiel, ``the last thing the
Democratic leaders want is to have attention paid to someone like
Larry Agran, which would reinforce the impression that they are
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putting forward a `field of unknowns.' ''
Secondly, said Rosenstiel, it is difficult and expensive and
confusing for the media to have to contend with a lot of candidates.
``Journalists don't sit around in newsrooms asking `Whom else
should we cover?' The big question is `Whom can we stop covering?' ''
An election, said Rosenstiel, ``is not a matter of who is the smartest,
the most articulate, or who has the best ideas. . . . What it really comes
down to is who can win the most votes.'' Ultimately, Rosenstiel noted,
``if we think someone is not likely to win, then we don't think of them
as someone to devote much time to.''
Journalists also look to each other to see who is being taken as a
``serious'' candidate. Bill Wheatley of NBC News, which excluded
Agran from its televised debate, told me that press coverage was
``certainly one of the factors.'' He continued: ``A number of
independent news organizations had made that judgment to exclude
Agran. It's not a conspiracy. One needs to pay attention to one's
colleagues' decisions.'' Yet while Wheatley saw press decisions as
``independent,'' he admitted that ``journalistic consensus in part
reflects consensus of party professionals who have some experience
knowing who is electable.''
Similarly, Alvin Sanoff, Senior Editor at U.S. News and World
Report, told me: ``Journalists all talk to the same people, the same
readers of tea leaves. We have similar kinds of input from similar
sources. It takes a leap of faith to say, `we're missing the story.'
. . . We all read and talk to each other. We speak to similar experts
and gurus and poll takers. We're influenced by the same influences.''
New York Times reporter Betsy Kolbert told me that reporters
there felt queasy about what she referred to as ``the Agran call,'' that
is, the implicit, collective decision not to cover his campaign. This news
judgment, however, had nothing to do with what the reporters thought
the public's reaction to Agran would be. ``The public would have
loved him,'' Kolbert told me, ``he was so different.'' But once Agran
was excluded from ``the consensus,'' there was little he could do to
register with the national media.

The Origins of National Journalistic Logic
Without national coverage, of course, a presidential campaign is
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doomed, regardless of local coverage and local public reaction. I have
no space here to analyze all the factors that I believe contributed to the
national journalistic consensus to exclude Agran (contrasted with the
relatively respectful local press coverage that he received). But I will
briefly list ten of them.
1. Limited resources for gathering news within each organization
(made worse in 1992 by a bad economy) and limited news space/time
(made worse during this campaign by the decline in ad revenues) led to
a logical attempt to narrow the field of candidates.
2. National journalists' reliance on ``official sources'' for
definitions of what and who are ``news,'' for a general ``informed
perspective,'' for ``objective reporting,'' and for feedback on their
reporting, led the national media to define ``major'' candidates in
relation to what party officials believed ─ and wanted the press to
report ─ rather than in relation to the potential response to candidates
on the part of the public.
3. The significant influence of centralized news organizations
allowed a relatively small number of decision-makers to shape the
general patterns of coverage for over 200 million citizens. Decisions
made at the New York Times and the Washington Post affected the
reporting of every other national news organization. Similarly, network
TV decisions affected local TV coverage, and the national Associated
Press, for example, guided the local AP coverage.
4. National journalists' herd instincts (``pack journalism'') led
journalists to move into even greater synchrony with each other in
terms of who was and was not covered, as well as the general style of
coverage. Since this synchrony was not the result of an explicit
conspiracy, it was viewed as ``the one correct way to cover the
campaign,'' as evidenced by the seemingly independent judgment of
many different journalists.
5. Conventional definitions of ``objectivity'' restricted coverage to
the ``major'' candidates. Since authoritative sources (and other news
media) were not identifying Agran as a ``major'' candidate, for
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example, journalists perceived the idea of giving his campaign
significant coverage as a form of non-objective promotion of his
candidacy.
6. Journalists' desire to hide the arbitrariness of news judgments
and the potential impact of such judgments on the outcome of
campaigns (``We don't make the news, we just report it'') led them to
stick with their initial decisions not to give much coverage to Agran ─
regardless of what happened later. (To my mind, this also explains why
journalists felt they had to cover no-party candidate Ross Perot as soon
as he hinted that he might enter the race. Since billionaire Perot had
the money to buy direct access to the public through the media, not
covering him would make the public aware of the media as ``censors.''
In contrast, true third-party candidates, such as Lenora Fulani of the
New Alliance Party and Libertarian Andre Marrou, were virtually
ignored by the news media and were excluded from the
nationally-televised debates.) The journalists I interviewed were very
hesitant to share with the public the reasoning they used in deciding
how to cover candidates as well as which candidates not to cover.
7. Journalists' desire for ``prestige assignments'' led them to focus
on ``the stars.'' Covering the candidates most likely to reach the
highest levels of power lays the groundwork for journalists to have
good ``access to authoritative sources,'' a wise career strategy. (From
the very beginning, the Clinton campaign was seen as the premiere
assignment, which led to both more positive and more negative
coverage of Clinton as the campaign proceeded.)
8. The primacy of television in the campaign lent weight to criteria
that made sense to commercial TV network executives, such as
keeping the debates short (so as not to lose too much commercial
time), and limiting the debates to celebrity candidates being
interviewed by celebrity journalists (in order to enhance network
prestige and maximize ratings and viewer flow-through to subsequent
commercial programs).
9. Journalists' patronizing attitudes about the public's intelligence
and attention span made them concerned about keeping the
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``campaign story'' and possible outcomes as simple as possible.
10. Non-campaign season news conventions limit the range of
voices that are viewed as legitimate during campaigns. (The highly
selective range of typical news narratives fosters the perception that
only candidates who discuss domestic and foreign policy within those
narrative frames are ``reasonable'' and ``serious'' and ``moderate''
enough to be elected. One typical narrative within the U.S. press with
regard to foreign aid, for example, involves the debate over ``how
much the U.S. should spend to promote democracy in other
countries.'' There is little questioning of whether that is indeed what the
money is intended to do. Thus, Agran's plan to end all foreign military
aid because it has typically gone to support dictators, and his suggestion
to offer foreign ``people aid'' instead, did not fit easily into a familiar
mainstream press narrative and made him seem radical, non-serious,
and fringy.'')
All these factors conspired to keep Agran in the shadows of
national coverage. (Most of these factors are linked to issues of power
in Washington and New York, and they therefore had less influence
on the reporting of the local press. So while we often think of the local
press as inferior to the national media, one could make the opposite
case according to these criteria.)
In short, these influences and others shape a national journalistic
logic that fosters a relatively closed frame for campaign reporting that is
only slightly sensitive to high degrees of public dissatisfaction with the
``system'' and with ``major'' candidates.

Conclusion
Television exposure certainly demystifies those politicians we see
frequently. But the sense that we see so much ─ even too much ─ is
deceptive. The exposure of visible politicians distracts us from realizing
how little we really know about crucial social issues and other potential
leaders.
The 1992 U.S. presidential election stood out for the unprecedented level of voter dissatisfaction with politics as usual. Polls
showed disenchantment with both parties and with all the so-called
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``major'' candidates. Voters expressed the wish that other candidates
had entered the race. The press dutifully reported on these polls (and
on some of the lies and the shortcomings of each of the major
candidates.) But a truly responsive democratic press would go further.
It would widen the spotlight beyond the centerstage that is the subject
of public discontent. The 1992 election was also the first to follow the
revolutions in Eastern Europe that swept traditional leadership aside
and brought to power those who had once inhabited the political
margins, even jail cells. The U.S. press generally applauded these
changes and saw them as movements toward ``our way of life.'' Yet
there is little indication that the U.S. press is willing to expand U.S.
democracy by widening its coverage.
My approach here is distinct from that of James Fallows, who has
argued that a cynical press is ruining public discourse. Although I think
Fallows' bold and important work is correct in describing how the
press typically reports on campaigns, I think he is off the mark on two
issues. First, I see the press behavior as a reaction to the intimate,
demystifying setting of TV, not creating this demystification. (Large
segments of the public were disgusted with LBJ and Nixon, while the
press was still very respectful to them.) Second, as the Agran case study
suggests, the press, with all its surface cynicism, still remains too much
in awe of the powerful to expand the spotlight of media politics to
include a broader range of ideas and candidates. Even as the press is
currently condemning politicians for engaging in questionable
campaign fundraising practices, the press is failing to examine its own
practice of largely ignoring candidates who do not have large campaign
``war chests.'' Candidates who are not backed by the wealthy and the
powerful are rarely evaluated by the major media on the basis of their
stands on the issues. Instead they are viewed as ``spoilers'' of the
aspirations of the so-called ``major'' candidates.
NBC's Bill Wheatley is partly right. There is no conspiracy. No
conspiracy is necessary to reach general consistency of thought and
action if journalists come to the situation with similar training, follow
similar routines, interact with the same sources and with each other,
and monitor each other's judgments. Through typical national press
routines, incestuous and intersubjective judgments among a cluster of
elite decision-makers (party officials, news executives, and debate
organizers) take on the aura of objective reality.
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Press judgments are based on an internal logic that makes
journalistic practices seem reasonable and safe for democracy. Yet this
case study suggests that current national journalistic practice serves as a
form of political censorship that may not be in the public interest. A
presidential candidate who was shot or tortured by another country's
secret police, would become a cause célèbre. But Agran and other
candidates, though physically unharmed, have been much more
effectively silenced. They have been dubbed ``not newsworthy.'' And
each decision not to cover them is used as another justification to push
them further into the dark hole on non-news. There they and their
plans for the country join many other throwaway citizens and many
other throwaway ideas.
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